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Abstract: In Sub-Saharan African countries, governments are increasingly devolving natural resource
management from central administration to the local government level as a trend toward subsidiarity.
In parallel, efforts to implement formalization processes have resulted in a puzzling institutional
arena, wherein mixed actors are struggling to influence the paths of institutional change and the
associated distribution of land and land-related resources. Relying on political ecology and new
institutionalism in social anthropology, we investigate how the decentralization of formalization of
rights in artisanal and small-scale gold mining can lead to paradoxical outcomes, often negatively
impacting social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Two comparative case studies are
performed in Ghana. Our results show that the negative effects of formalization efforts for resource
end users are to be understood in the broad context of actors’ repositioning strategies following the
selective implementation of decentralization. The authors conclude that increasing the power of
the central government and line ministries to control local resources can influence the disenfran-
chisement of local people’s participation and control of natural resources, resulting in a relentless
environmental crisis.
Keywords: artisanal mining; conflict; decentralization; formalization; sustainability
1. Introduction
The World Bank and other international donor communities have often supported
decentralization of “natural resource management (NRM)” based on the assumption that
it would bring governance down to local level actors and generate a range of positive
outcomes, including ecological sustainability and poverty reduction [1–3]. However, re-
search on decentralization mostly focuses on organizational issues and less on outputs and
consequences in terms of sustainability [4]. In this paper, we investigate the mechanisms of
formalization initiatives to show how the decentralization of the formalization of rights
in “artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASM)” can lead to paradoxical outcomes, often
negatively impacting social, economic, and environmental sustainability.
In the last two decades, developing countries have been implementing new global
trade rules and the formalization of rights to respond to the menace of informal ASM in re-
source management and use [5–7]. Even though the existing literature on the formalization
of mining rights is extensive and focuses particularly on obtaining credit, some authors [6,7]
have raised critical issues about the inadvertent consequences that can stem from such a
drive. In particular, there is a growing critique that formalization can exacerbate inequities
and heighten conflicts between local resource users and state regulators over unpaid fees
and taxes [7,8]. There has also been a critique of formalization having a negative impact
on peasants’ livelihood and environmental quality [9]. These concerns have been driving
forces behind international efforts to establish new rules, norms, and institutions governing
responsible gold mining practices [5].
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At the same time, Western private-sector organizations, such as RESOLVE and the
Alliance for Responsible Mining, introduced the “Code of Risk mitigation for Artisanal and
small-scale miners engaging in Formal Trade (CRAFT)” to improve the social, economic,
and environmental performance, transparency, and market acceptability of the ASM sector
and the traceability of artisanal gold [6–8]. However, formalization and CRAFT are con-
tested in some jurisdictions, including Ghana, because sustainability improvement remains
slow [7].
Relying on a new institutionalist approach and insights from political ecology, our
research analyzes the effects of formalization measures as well as their institutional mecha-
nisms in Ghana. We ask: how is it to be explained that, paradoxically, the decentralization
of the formalization of rights in ASM has promoted informal ASM, often referred to as
galamsey, in Ghana, leading to a negative impact on social, economic, and environmental
sustainability? Which strategies do local resource users develop for and against informal
ASM? We follow three lines of arguments: firstly, we demonstrate that the negative effects
of formalization initiatives are to be understood in the broad context of actors’ repositioning
strategies, following the selective implementation of decentralization in Ghana. Secondly,
we argue that the negative impact on social, economic, and environmental sustainability
of formalization initiatives might result from some of the inherent characteristics of the
CRAFT. Thirdly, we illustrate that the consequences of formalization initiatives will force
local resource users to switch to more marginal resources, which are then overexploited
and further threaten resource sustainability.
Ghana makes an interesting case study to critically analyze the intertwined relation-
ship among decentralization policy, mining title formalization, and CRAFT because of the
prominent role that they play in current NRM practices. Like many Sub-Saharan African
countries, the exploitation of gold ore in Ghana is shaped by three main sources of formal
rules, including public policies, mining concession, and customary law. Customary law
governs surface land rights while statutory laws and regulations govern subterranean
mineral resources, leading to a situation where gold ore mining is the result of the interac-
tions of customary law and government laws and regulations. This affects the governance
and coordination of mineral wealth exploitation, which can positively or negatively affect
resource sustainability [10–13].
The following section presents the contradictory incentives resulting from the dual
existence of so-called customary laws and government laws and regulations in NRM.
Section 3 provides the materials and methods. In Section 4, we explore decentralized
NRM through the lens of two case studies in Ghana. Section 5 presents the main empirical
findings. In Section 6, we discuss our study hypotheses, and we provide a conclusion in
Section 7.
2. Theoretical Framework, Contextual Factors, and Working Hypotheses
2.1. Aligning the New Institutionalist and Political Ecology Perspectives
We rely on political ecology [14] and components of the new institutionalism in
social anthropology [12,15,16] as a heuristic and conceptual approach to analyze redis-
tribution processes associated with decentralization of NRM and the consequences on
social, economic, and environmental sustainability. In the context of legal pluralism and
the acknowledgement of different actors’ powers and interests in NRM in Ghana, bringing
together the two approaches is apt in the sense that the New Institutionalism defines
concepts of the interrelations of factors leading to institutional changes and describes the
use and overuse of surface and underground resources, while political ecology brings
in a concrete analysis of power held by local power-holding actors, state agencies, and
multinational entities.
Institutions—“the rules of the game”—regulating resource management and use
constantly arise in a given historical, political-legal, and socioeconomic context, which is
shaped by power relations that political ecology focuses on describing [17]. To this end,
new institutionalism in social anthropology [15,16] shows how internal and external market
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forces and the dynamics of the resource context for ASM lead to rationale strategies and
forum/institution shopping (selection of customary and statutory rules and regulations)
by actors competing for access to land for mining and the arrangement that distributes
resources unevenly. This variant will direct our analysis on how decentralization in NRM
phases out or diminishes constraints (high transaction costs) and enhances resource users’
incentives to access and invest in land and land-related resources. It will add to our
understanding of how mining rights can be structured to avert externalities to resource
owners and the society at large.
Political ecology [14] offers a concrete analysis of power relations and focuses on who
receives what and when and the corresponding winners and losers. The perspective will
help us understand the “agency of social groups in the redistribution processes occurring in
decentralization of NRM” by examining the narratives “including materialist aspects (price
of input, market selection, struggle for survival)” and counter-narratives “including idealist
aspects (beliefs, framing struggles, networks)” [18,19] and how unequal relations of power
create a situational rationality that forces local resource users to destroy their environment.
2.2. The Main Mining Regulation Efforts since Colonial Era
Since the British colonial administration in Ghana, minerals and mining legislations
have been initiated by successive governments to enable actors to gain, control, and main-
tain access to resources and ensure responsible mining. In Northern Ghana, the colonial
administration enacted the Mineral Rights Ordinance, which vested all mineral rights in
the British crown [20]. The ordinance empowered the governor to restrict local chiefs from
granting concessions, regulate the use of mercury in gold mining, and constrict the mining
rights of Indigenes. The exclusionary measures marked the beginning of informal ASM,
which became a major threat to European mining concessions, rural inhabitants, and the
ecosystem of local communities.
Soon after Ghana’s independence in 1957, several laws and regulations were enacted
to consolidate state control of mineral wealth [5,20]. Article 257(6) of the 1992 Constitution
upheld that “every mineral in its natural state . . . is the property of the Republic of Ghana
and shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana”.
Therefore, the state is the ultimate owner of mineral resource wealth and shall be in full
control and supervision of the exploitation, development, processing, and utilization of any
mineral in water and above and under any land surface thereof. The Ghanaian President
can vest authority in the appointed Minister of Lands and Natural Resources to administer
and dispose of the state’s mineral resource reserves.
Following Ghana’s economic stagnation in 1970–1980, the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund introduced the “structural adjustment program (SAP)” to revive
the mining sector. Subsequently, the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 was enacted, which
provided mine incentives to attract foreign mining investors to Ghana. The law crimi-
nalized ASM and provided multinational corporations an avenue to exploit vulnerable
communities and pushed local citizens to shift to marginal and progressively diminishing
parcels of land for their livelihood.
In 1989, three additional legislations were enacted: the Mercury law—“Provisional
National Defence Council Law (PNDCL)” 217—regulates the use of mercury in gold mining,
the “Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation (PMMC)” law (PNDCL 219) provides
official marketing channels for gold produced by miners in Ghana, and the Small-Scale
Gold Mining law (PNDCL 218) was the first attempt to introduce a license system and
district assistance centers to regulate ASM. In 2006, the Minerals and Mining Act (Act 703)
was passed to enhance tenure security and eliminate barriers to improve sustainability.
Section 83(a) emphasizes that only adult Ghanaians (18 years and above) can be granted
a license for ASM operations. Additionally, Act 703 recognizes the role foreign mining
companies can play in the area of mine support services to concession holders.
Under Act 703, artisanal and small-scale miners can apply for a concession of 25 acres
(10 hectares) of land in designated areas of a district through the “Minerals Commission
Sustainability 2021, 13, 6885 4 of 23
(MC)”. Current estimates are that less than 30% of artisanal and small-scale miners have
a license [21]. The large majority who remain informal draw on the customary institu-
tional framework to legitimize their claim to land and related resources, which results in
conflicts between them and concession holders. In this context, mining rights and access
are about relations among social actors involving benefits or values, including appropria-
tion, accumulation, transfer, and distribution. In the past 15 years, efforts to consolidate
decentralization have increased to improve the access and control of ASM in Ghana.
2.3. Decentralization Efforts in Ghana
In Ghana, the move towards decentralization involved efforts to shift control over
NRM to a range of local government actors [2,4]. The changes in rights and powers
in NRM are supported by the argument that there will be an increase in local control
over resources—whether in the hands of user groups or Indigenous communities—and
is therefore a good thing [22]. For example, in Ghana’s forest management strategy, the
central government backs user groups over elected local governments to govern forest
reserves, thus empowering traditional nondemocratic authorities over forests [23].
In the late 1980s, the PNDCL 207 was enacted to grant local government—“Metropolitan,
Municipal, District Assemblies (MMDAs)”—significant discretion over mediation in dis-
putes as well as the right to issue business permits to owners of processing facilities, to
enforce environmental laws, and to stipulate that any project or program that may cause
air, soil, and water pollution; resource depletion; climate change; or the loss of biodiversity
requires the approval of the affected MMDAs [4]. In addition, the MMDAs are entitled
to a share of the resource revenues, royalties, and ground rents from activities involving
the development of mineral resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the
PNDCL 207 grants control over small-scale gold mining in the MMDAs.
In response to the growing grievances of informal ASM in the early 1990s, the MMDAs
established checkpoints to collect tax revenues to address the environmental crisis resulting
from ASM. This strategy was short lived as the national government enacted Act 490 to
grant the “Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)” the power to issue environmental
permits to any project likely to have a potentially adverse impact on the environment. The
EPA appears to promote this specific policy measure in favor of an eco-rent development
interest to reinforce their own benefits. While the EPA short-term profit maximization ob-
jectives take the upper hand, environmental degradation continues to increase. Comparing
the 1990s to today, environmental degradation and water pollution have worsened in an
unprecedented manner, which raises concerns about sustainability challenges.
2.4. Sustainability Challenges in Ghana
Sustainability in this context refers to the adoption of practices in the mining operations
stage that results in environmental and social advancement with the aim of diminishing
negative impact, while maintaining the health and safety of mine workers, the interests of
diverse stakeholders, and the affected communities, in order not to endanger the potential
needs of future generation [24]. Since the 1987 Brundtland Commission, the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit, and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, the government of Ghana
has taken initiatives in response to the grievances in the extractive sector that are being
described as antithetical to sustainability to make communities inclusive, safe, and resilient.
Apart from the government’s environmental laws and the formalization of mining
rights, other international socioecological labelling and certification organizations intro-
duced initiatives to promote equitable and sustainable exploitation of mineral resource
wealth [6,7]. One of such initiative is CRAFT, which facilitates engagement between down-
stream supply chain actors and upstream ASM producers to source gold in conformance
with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Due Diligence Guide-
line. CRAFT enables ASM producers to participate in international markets since many
gold buyers in the global North and environmental activists have associated responsible
gold mining practices with healthiness and environmental sustainability [6].
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However, in recent years, Ghana’s mining sector faces difficult sustainability chal-
lenges because of the growing social and environmental grievances, human rights abuses,
and lack of health and safety measures in mines. Studies [25,26] of mining operations in
Ghana showed that the forest cover (~2.51 million hectares) and green vegetation have been
removed due to open pit mining activities, which imperils the surface land to water erosion,
resulting in loss of nutrient-rich topsoil. With this background in mind, we formulate two
broad working hypotheses that will not be tested statistically but will provide guidance for
our data collection and discussion to answer the research questions.
2.5. Working Hypotheses
The H1 presents how the decentralization process is envisaged to work according
to its proponents. The H2 builds on insights from political ecology and new institu-
tional economics to politicize the redistribution of use rights to resources resulting from
decentralization efforts. H2 therefore focuses on actors’ strategies and power games in
decentralization.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Decentralization in NRM will lead to positive social and environmental
outcomes. As decentralization empowers Indigenous and local communities through a more direct
involvement in NRM, local citizens are incentivized to create and implement transparent social
and environmental standards themselves—devoid of external influence—and perform downward
accountability, leading to sustainability and equity in benefit sharing.
Considering that actors do not stand idly by while mining procedures are being
decentralized, we expect that H1 might not fully capture the processes at play.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Together with CRAFT, the decentralization of procedures in ASM leads to
different actors repositioning their strategies to promote their interests and increase their bargain-
ing power, which ultimately leads to a negative impact on social, economic, and environmental
sustainability. This is to be explained by the following mechanisms:
1. Central government actors will not let their responsibilities go to local people. As
national authorities have agency, they will reinforce a neopatrimonial political culture
to take advantage of public positions for private gains. This takes the form of noninter-
ference where informal activities are tolerated, leading to resource over exploitation
and environmental crises.
2. Decentralization in NRM enables newcomers to gain access to local resources, leading
to conflicts between newcomers and locals. As newcomers usually have exclusive
rights to land and related resources guaranteed by the state due to their financial and
political capital, they will enclose “common pool resources (CPR)”—i.e., resources
(e.g., irrigation water, pastures) whose uses are competitive and whose characteristics
make it difficult to prevent newcomers from using them. This will compel the ex-
cluded locals to shift to more marginal land resources, which are then overexploited
to make income. Under these circumstances, anger will set in among locals who are
willing to fight newcomers over CPR that are becoming increasingly scarcer.
3. The neoliberal nature of CRAFT may lead to unwanted outcomes. As CRAFT enables
resource exploiters to participate in international markets, local structures and orga-
nizations that regulate internal markets are bypassed, resulting in revenue loss and
thereby endangering state land reclamation activities.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Study Design
We rely on a comparative case study strategy to gather the empirical materials to
discuss our research hypotheses [27]. The strategy can help us to interrogate the differences,
but also the similarities, of whether the policy tools to address sustainability in ASM
are appropriate.
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3.2. Case Selection
For comparative analysis, we selected cases from Bole (Figure 1) and Talensi (Figure 2),
which constitute two different administrative regions in Ghana. In both of these case
study areas, informal ASM are managed de facto by customary systems that operate in
parallel to government laws. Customary systems themselves differ substantially, in the
extent to which traditional beliefs, norms, and values govern resource use, and regarding
the role and legitimacy of customary authorities: the Bole case in the Savannah Region is
characterized by a hierarchical and nondemocratic customary system with allodial titles
vested in customary chiefs through a formal recognition of the “Customary Land Secretariat
(CLS)”. The CLS is a local or traditional land governance structure established by stool,
skin, clan, or family that owns land within the MMDAs with the technical support of
the regional “Lands Commission (LC)” and district “Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands (OASL)”. Stool or skin describes the symbol of authority of customary chiefs. Any
authority responsible for the management of stool, skin, clan, and family land is a fiduciary
mandated with the obligation to discharge customary land management functions for the
benefit of the subjects of the stool, skin, clan, or family and must be accountable as such.
The CLS is responsible for maintaining accurate records of land transactions and facilitates
the settlement of land disputes through alternative dispute resolution. The MMDAs Stool
Lands Officer is to ensure that the CLS complies with its mandate, including the submission
of land transaction records to the LC and OASL at the end of every half year.
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case in the U per East Region is a so-called acephalous customary sys-
tem, which in recent years came to be characterized by competing claims f authority
by customary chiefs and tindana (ear h pri sts) over customary l nd management func-
tions. The impo ition of ustomary chiefs in Talensi during the era of the British coloni l
administration, which c ntin es today under the guise of the contemporary independent
African state, has created tensio between custom ry chiefs and others [29,30]. Such a
struggle for authority over customary land is exacerbated with the increasi g importance
of ASM in the area, making the case uniquely complex and interesting for understanding
dynamics of NRM at the local levels. In contrast, Dokrupe and Tinga in Bole present a
case of a well-structured customary land management system where a significant share of
the existing mining activities takes place on an ASM basis with less tension and conflict
over the decentralized system of NRM at the local level [4]. Unlike the Talensi where high
intracommunity conflicts and tension engulf the communities constituting our chosen
cases (i.e., Datuku and Gbani), the selected communities in the Bole case are peaceful. This
makes it interesting for a detailed comparative analysis.
3.3. Methods
We carried out our data collection from February to May 2019 and November 2020
to February 2021. We commenced data collection at the national level, then moved down-
wardly to regional, district, and community levels. Unlike quantitative research where
the selection of respondents is based on the representation of the population, we carefully
identified and selected our respondents from each of the levels based on their unique
knowledge of our research questions [31]. Our data was drawn from a variety of sources
founded on a mixed-method approach widely used in social anthropology and human
geography [17]. At the national level, we held expert interviews with six senior government
authorities at the “Ministry of Lands and Natural Resource (MLNR)”, the “Geological
Survey Authority (GSA)”, the MC, and the PMMC in Accra. This yielded data on the
history of mineral resource governance, evolution, and rationale of formalization, evolving
institutional arrangements, and practices and challenges of regulations and access to small-
scale gold licenses. In addition, the first author participated in a national conference on
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ASM in Accra on 14–15 May 2019 that brought together development practitioners and
government officials at different levels. This exposure provided opportunities for informal
conversation and participant observations of policy implementation and local debates on
Ghana’s ASM policy and regulatory regime with a focus on gold over a longer time span.
At the regional level, we interviewed six senior officers at the LC, the Wa and Bolgatanga
MC, and the EPA, which yielded data on changes in land tenure, surface land governance,
ground rents, access to compensation, and access to environmental and social permits.
In Bole, we conducted interviews with the “District Chief Executive (DEC)”, five
administrative heads of the “District Assembly (DA)”, the Department of Agriculture
(DoA), the “Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA)”, and the CLS and ASM
associations for different perspectives on decentralized NRM and local resource users’
compliance with national environmental laws and local bylaws. In Dokrupe and Tinga, the
selection of respondents typically proceeded based on “snowball sampling”, which taps lo-
cal contacts and existing respondents to identify other respondents [4]. Data collection from
this category of respondents drew on insights from the life-course methodology, which
uses subjective life accounts as an analytical entry point to understand broader processes of
political and institutional change [32]. Thus, we held semistructured interviews with two
local chiefs, two gold committees, four community leaders, two assembly members, and
eight unlicensed local resource users. This generated narratives of claims of above- and
underground resources, license and permit acquisition, and gold trade and sustainability
issues, including miners’ rights, community welfare, use of natural resources, emissions
and land reclamation, and firm governance. Additionally, questionnaires were adminis-
tered to 50 household heads separately for settlers and Indigenes by trained enumerators,
which gathered data on the impact of ASM on household members. We conducted “focus
group discussions (FGD)” separately for settlers, Indigenes, and youth. The FGD gath-
ered a total of 55 participants comprised of people either engaged in or directly affected
by ASM. The FGD provided details about the practices, perceptions, and pitfalls in the
implementation of ASM licensing, access to surface land rights and concession, and local
counterclaims and the construction of resistance identities. Finally, we visited two streams,
two mining and processing sites, and two unlicensed gold trading shops to observe daily
human interactions, actions, and behavior in relation to the physical environment and
material objects.
In Talensi, we interviewed the DCE, four administrative heads of the DA, the DoA, the
CWSA, and the ASM association. We held semistructured interviews with two local chiefs,
four landowners, two assembly members, and eight unlicensed and three licensed local
resource users (including one representative from “Shaanxi Mining (GH) Company Ltd.
(SMCL)”) and conducted biographic interviews with mine workers. Furthermore, FGDs
were held with eight members of the “Movement of Gbani People for Justice (MGPJ)”, seven
members of the union of tindana, and community members. Key insights were also gained
through attending two community meetings with villagers, MMDAs authorities, and
development workers. Causal interactions with key stakeholders in these meetings also
informed the arguments and analysis in this paper. Trained data enumerators administered
questionnaires to 50 household heads. We visited one stream, two licensed and unlicensed
mining and processing sites, and two licensed gold trading shops.
3.4. Data Process, Analysis, and Presentation
Data gathered from expert interviews, semistructured interviews, biographic inter-
views, FGD, and observation were recorded in field diaries and notes. We organized and
coded the data according to recurring themes and key concepts, such as power, participa-
tion, and sustainability of mine operations, to make our analysis. We reclassified sustain-
ability issues into social, economic, and environmental dimensions. We then presented
our respondents’ narratives, life stories, and interpretation. In this paper, generalizations
are mainly based on informed assessments and perceptions of our respondents, rather
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than on quantitative analysis. In the following section, we outline the contexts of the two
case studies.
4. Case Study: Decentralized Mineral Resource Governance
In both the Bole and Talensi case studies, we describe governance changes from the colo-
nial to the postcolonial era, including programs to centralize, democratize, and decentralize
NRM and economic and land reform policies with far-reaching effects.
4.1. Community Mining Program in Bole
Historically, the Indigenous peasant communities were granted rights to land and
water through agrarian reforms beginning in 1962. This led to the production of food
and cash crops for subsistence and income. Households watered livestock and crops
from village streams. However, the benefits of the rights began to be divested through
relentless processes of environmental deterioration due to informal ASM. Mining activities
and related environmental degradation have waxed and waned since the early twentieth
century but have increased significantly during the past decade, with a rise in the price of
gold [9].
The colonial administration granted mining concessions to six European mining
firms [20]. Social and environmental concerns were key to the functioning of mines. There-
fore, formal rules were instituted by Regional and District Commissioners to ensure the
safety of the environment and of the people living around mining areas. District Commis-
sioners had the right to revoke prospecting activities if such would affect livelihoods and
bodies of water [20]. By the time of Ghana’s independence in 1957, almost all European
mining firms had ceased mining operations in Northern Ghana and paved the way for the
involvement of artisanal miners.
Currently, there are over 20,000 people from relative low-income groups who derive
their means of livelihoods, income, and employment from informal ASM [20]. This is due
to the negative effects of the implementation of the SAP. Act 703 clearly states that artisanal
and small-scale mining is reserved for Ghanaians. Yet, a very notable phenomenon has
occurred in the past decade with the high participation of foreign miners in informal ASM.
Recognizing that informal ASM provides employment, income, and livelihood to most of
the rural poor population, the national government launched a community mining program
(i.e., semilegal mining), which focuses on protecting the environment and livelihoods of
local communities.
4.2. Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Talensi
When a gold ore deposit was discovered and exploited by residents in 1994, miners
negotiated directly with customary authorities, bypassing the MC to grant permits. To
wit, all underground mineral resources are vested in the President in trust for Ghanaians,
while allodial rights over surface land rests in the hands of customary authorities [33].
Subsequently, the MC declared that artisanal and small-scale miners must hold a mining
license and apply for concession. The wisdom is that the formal institution and the plainly
demarcated concession rights define a right to exclude third parties, which is necessary to
promote the efficient use of resources to achieve sustainability [11,17].
In this context, a Chinese SMCL was registered in 2008 to provide mine support services
to registered small-scale miners. Due to its strong political and financial influence, SMCL
abandoned its initial mine support services to undertake large-scale underground gold
mining by acquiring both the concessions of Purbotabaa and Yenyeya [21]. The company
uses discourses of providing a good mining model for small-scale miners to emulate;
of wage labor for impoverished residents whose agricultural yields face a decline due
to encroaching desertification, prolonged drought, and lack of subsidies on agricultural
inputs; and of avoiding the wastage of gold resource in tailings.
In 2011, SMCL acquired the lease rights of 747.41 acres of customary land from the
Gbani chief [21]. Gbani is inhabited by four clans who used the former land for pastures
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together with pastoralists from Datuku under a common property regime. SMCL was
interested in the land for building an office complex, staff bungalows, and a processing
plant and only contacted the Gbani chief to acquire the land. Neither tindanas nor clan
or family heads were included in the negotiation concerning the land leased for 50 years
to SMCL. Geological maps from the GSA and SMCL corroborate that the land had been
enclosed, which constrained access to several CPR indispensable for local livelihood and
shifting cultivation. Police personnel drawn from the district and regional levels keep
the land under surveillance. As such, marginalized people lost the use of the commons
for cash generation, and their ability to be resilient in times of food insecurity has been
reduced dramatically [17]. Instead, only 350 residents were employed by SMCL, which is
often referenced as compensation for their loss of access to the forgone CPR [21].
At the same time, the Ghanaian government’s adoption of CRAFT, which makes it
possible for ASM producers to participate in international gold markets under the guise of
responsible mining practice, gave new lease of life to ASM in mining communities across
the country, including Talensi and Bole. Indeed, many gold buyers in the global north and
environmental campaigners associate countries and gold producers who adopt CRAFT
with practicing responsible mining. The Ghanaian government embraced CRAFT alongside
the intensification of mining concessions. In this context, transnational mining concessions
are facilitated by the government of Ghana’s concurrent implementation of policies to use
national resources to fuel socioeconomic development and to encourage foreign direct
investment. Coupled with the wider phenomenon of transnational enclosure motivated by
the Chinese international development policy encouraging overseas investments, trade,
and migration, Chinese investment into mining in Ghana has increased rapidly since the
2000s [34].
However, the intensification of mining has been far from tranquil as locals and miners
are in constant conflict due to grievances and livelihood dispossession, compelling vulner-
able and marginalized groups to shift to marginal lands. These put to test the extent to
which the Ghanaian decentralized system of NRM and its politics of policy implementation
alongside the embrace of CRAFT play out in attaining their sustainability goal in ASM at
the local level. In the following section, we present, in a comparative manner, the practical
modalities involved in implementing a decentralized NRM policy at the local level for both
Bole and Talensi.
5. Results—The Politics of Policy Implementation
5.1. Actors Repositioning Strategies in Decentralized NRM after 2006
Table 1 presents data obtained from various qualitative methods supplemented by
intensive policy documents and a literature review. We explain how actors use different
instruments to shift positions in decentralized NRM by identifying the differences, but also
similarities, between Bole and Talensi. In summary, the results show that informal actors
are slowly adjusting their strategies to local institutional realities by identifying key local
actors/elites who can help tilt the institutional balance in their favor to practice informal
ASM activities under the guise of fulfilling responsible mining practices.
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Table 1. National and local actors repositioning strategies.
Actors Results of Bole Results of Talensi
The MC
The national government instituted a licensing regime in 2006 and a
community mining program in 2019 based on a patrimonial
structure. The logic behind the interventions is to reduce negative
environmental impacts, stop gold smuggling, and enable the state to
generate the necessary revenue through processing mineral rights,
mining licenses, leases, and royalties. However, access to both
licenses and participation in the community mining program can be
described as dependent on political and financial capital. However,
the district MC was yet to be established to compile a register of
small-scale miners, form a small-scale miners’ association, and
provide extension services. Supervision and monitoring of mining is
done by the national MC and the Wa MC.
Though the MC is not a present or visible actor at the local level,
miners are required to hold licenses to operate. The MC formed an
interministerial taskforce that bypassed the existing district and
regional security council to stop informal miners. The MC
reactivated Act 490 and CRAFT where it requested miners to comply
with all relevant local legislations and international best practices.
Technically, under Act 490, miners were required to submit
environmental and social impact assessment reports to the MC
before a mining license was awarded. Though Act 490 has existed
since 1994, it was only recently that the MC began to demand miners
to adopt CRAFT and submit reports of prior and postmine activities,
including safety protocols, mine closures, and land
reclamation strategies.
The MMDAs
PNDCL 207 established the MMDAs as a subordinate of the state to
grant or reject applications for mineral rights for large concessions. The
district formed a committee to monitor if informal ASM has met
challenges. However, central government authorities are unwilling
to implement a devolution of power that will permit the assembly to
enforce environmental laws and to clean up the environmental mess
in their territorial jurisdiction because national authorities find
opportunities to earn money from the status quo. Regrettably, in
2017, the national taskforce bypassed the assembly to combat
informal ASM in Tinga without conferring with them. The assembly
receives nothing from miners because they evade tax on the basis
that it is impropriate to tax an illegal business activity. Paying tax to
the assembly will suggest that the assembly endorses their
operations (Planner in Bole, Interview, 19.03.19).
Following the free and prior informed consent principle, the
assembly has received, assessed, and approved mineral rights for a
few local and foreign firms (Coordinating director in Talensi, Expert
interview, 23.05.19). Usually, the assembly organizes community
durbars to inform local citizens as well as publish mineral rights
applications in public places for two weeks to allow local citizens to
present petitions against applications (if any). In the absence of
dissatisfaction, the assembly grants mineral rights and then collects
royalties and fees from building and business operation permits. It
irregularly supervises miners and thus paves the ways for SMCL to
underdeclare output levels for the collection of accurate amounts of
tax payments (ibid). The collection and distribution of tax revenue
from SMCL and other registered mining companies is not




Chiefs activated the land administration project, which grants them
the power of attorney to allocate surface land rights to end users
through the CLS [35]. Chiefs find other ways to increase their interest
in subterranean resources by shopping for a forum to reopen old
mine shafts. Faced with a high demand for lease rights to mine,
chiefs reclaim common land granted to settlers in Dokrupe and Tinga
in the 1940s to make private profits for themselves and family
members. The empirical results indicate that chiefs have never
rejected informal ASM activities even if the communities will bear
the brunt of undesirable effects as long as it will result in a regular
flow of royalties to their coffers (Official of CLS in Bole, Expert
interview, 19.03.19).
Chiefs consolidate their position by referring to the Stool Lands
Administration Act 1994. The tindanas formed a union to better stand
up to the chiefs who are well represented in local government
agencies to cosign leases [30]. Drawing on natural resource
entitlements, the tindanas argued that they will not sit idly while gold
resources are taken by miners and their collaborators—chiefs. “No
one can issue a mining license to someone without letting tindanas
who are custodians of the land know about it” (Tindana in Gbani,
FGD, 18.05.19). Tindanas have often been narrowed in mineral rights
administration resulting in conflicts between themselves and chiefs,
on the one hand, and between themselves and concession holders,
on the other hand.
Non-concession
holders
The weakness of the assembly and the absence of the MC in the
communities provide opportunities for informal miners to scramble
for gold ore without a license and concessions contributing to
environmental degradation. Many informal miners expressed a
willingness to operate within the government’s legal framework, but
they were discouraged by the distribution of licenses to political
party supporters by the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources at
the expense of local miners who have no political influence
(Secretary of ASM in Bole, 20.03.19). Additionally, the excessive cost
(USD ~2400, including state approved and unapproved fees),
red-tapism, and delays (10–18 months) have demotivated them to
access mining licenses (Miner in Tinga, FGD, 04.12.20).
There is an unequal power relation between concession and
nonconcession holders resulting in conflict. Informal miners have a
weak position in the district gold resources. They derive gold ore
from the concession of others based on Indigeneity: “who was here
first”. The assumption is that access to gold on their homeland is
essentially a traditional right with or without title and that this right
serves as the only means to generate income for sustenance [28,33].
An informant told us that some family heads, including his dad,
were involved in selling unused family land to informal miners for
instant cash (Youth leader in Datuku, FGD, 24.05.19). They do not
pay ground rent to the LC and dodge paying fees to customary
authorities for land reclamation. Miners think the assembly is
responsible for reclaiming land.
Concession holders None
Concession holders use Act 703 to legitimize claims on gold and
power to prohibit informal miners from operating on acquired
concessions. They use modern mining machines and other
innovations intensifying the scale and efficiency of gold ore
extraction of large areas of land incredibly. License holders bypass
the local government to deal directly with the MC and sell gold
outside the community. Some local concession holders either
sublease or develop strategic partnerships with foreign miners for a
monthly salary. SMCL’s operations have generated local conflicts.
License holders do not cooperate with traditional structures and
organizations for land reclamation activities.
Source: Qualitative methods, intensive policy documents and literature review.
The Politics of National Policy Implementation
In Ghana, the MMDAs and local communities had high expectations for the establish-
ment of a district-level MC to provide doorstep services. Nevertheless, this process was
challenged by the central government’s inventive use of neoliberal resource governance to
reinforce tendencies associated with neopatrimonial political culture to undertake a series
of complex fiscal and administrative interventions that aim to disempower the MMDAs.
In the context of ASM, the state implemented a selective decentralization reform and
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concurrently enacted Act 703 where the authority to administer and dispose of mineral
resources wealth is now taken over by the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and
is administered by the MC. Act 703 provides for a clear-cut system of mineral resource
governance where the Minister has several mineral tenurial instruments at his/her dis-
posal to issue mining rights. He/she directs the MC to identify ASM areas in the district
and to perform the technical and commercial evaluation of the area. Thereafter, he/she
directs ASM operators to make claims to the mineral resource wealth area by obtaining
a small-scale license from him/her (Act 703, Section 82(1)). It seems that the centralized
control over mineral resource wealth in the national government stimulated interest among
foreign mining companies, leading to a dramatic increase in mining applications in the
last decade.
As such, the Minister takes advantage of his public position for political-economic
considerations by relegating the MMDAs, which are mandated to implement national
government policies including law enforcement. In 2017, the Minister instituted a morato-
rium on ASM for two consecutive years on the backdrop of national media environmen-
tal conservation discourse. Subsequently, a national taskforce—militarized enforcement
initiative—was established to enforce the moratorium. The taskforce entered the MMDAs
territories and undertook operations, including bribe collection from ASM gold producers,
and allowed some of them to mine (President of ASM association in Accra, Interview
15.05.19). For instance, the SMCL in Gbani could mine despite its informality [36], while lo-
cals were disenfranchised and their mining assets destroyed [21]. Since October 2017, local
miners have lobbied the Ghanaian President through the Council of State and National
House of Chiefs to lift the moratorium because of the loss of employment, income, and
livelihoods (President of ASM association in Accra, Interview 15.05.19).
Then, a few months before the December 2020 general elections, the Minister lifted the
ban, vetted ~900 miners, and recommenced the issuance of mining licenses, of which more
party foot soldiers (i.e., political party supporters) were granted a license to start immediate
mining (ibid). This corrupt practice is commonly associated with political parties that are in
power in Sub-Saharan African countries, where the Minister enjoys tremendous power and
the possibility to push his political agenda. With an eye on upcoming general elections, the
Minister will disburse state funded contracts or, in this instance, access to mineral resource
wealth to his political supporters from national to local levels in return for votes [21,37].
The privileging of foot soldiers and commercial interests (e.g., SMCL) over state regula-
tions contributed to a culture that has encouraged and reinforced rent-seeking by public
officials, especially through a tolerance of unlawful practices. This act of contempt and
disenfranchisement incensed MMDAs authorities to permit informal ASM activities that
are not subject to the existing legal framework by relaxing their monitoring and supervision
roles, resulting in a free-for-all looting of Ghana’s valuable natural resources, with atten-
dant large-scale environmental degradation [21] (Planning officer in Bole, Expert interview,
18.01.21).
5.2. Impact of ASM Formalization and CRAFT
In this section, we demonstrate that gold ore mining practices and a succession of min-
ing ordinances enacted by colonial, Ghanaian state authorities and recently by international
agencies have had direct consequences for local communities. We evaluated the perceived
impact of CRAFT by assessing its adoption by the state actors at the organizational level
and its implementation in practice (see also Section 5.1), including resource use (water and
wood fuel), mine waste, contamination in nearby bodies of water and soil, noise nuisance,
the closure and reclamation of exhausted mine lands, and social bonds.
5.2.1. Results of Bole
1. Environmental Impact
The results indicate that the recently introduced community mining program in
Tinga improved nothing. The widespread scars of explosives on the land surface include
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opened pits, deforestation, encroaching desertification, and the dramatic transformation
of stream and hand-dug wells. Local elites, such as the gold committees, do not enforce
land reclamation after mining the gold ore from the soil because their livelihoods do not
depend on farming or livestock keeping. Field observation results show that the streams
receive a greater load of mine sediment and contamination of hazardous chemicals, sewage,
and solid waste from adjacent mining sites. In Tinga, an elevated level of mercury in the
water is above that of the recommended World Health Organization for potable drinking
water [38]. We unexpectedly met children in the stream busily washing tailings for gold
dust without being sanctioned (Tinga, Field observation, 28.03.19). These children mine
probably because they see the opportunities CRAFT grants to ASM gold producers to mine
and sell the gold across the border.
Residents said that the stream is rendered unsuitable for both animal watering and
domestic use. We are informed that in the raining season (May–September), the swollen
stream deposits toxic silt immediately next to the bank, which contributes to rendering
the floodplain unproductive for dry season gardening. They informed us that 37 houses
with an estimated 343 people were forced to move uphill away from the stream edge to
the senior high school’s land in search of more fertile land for gardening (Peasant farmer
in Tinga, FGD, 12.12.20). In Dokrupe, heavy vehicles used for carrying gold bearing rocks
from mine sites to the community center caused damage to the bridge contributing to a
broadened floodplain and sandbars in the stream. In 2018 and 2019, the community was
inundated and enveloped with plastic debris and sediment that floated downstream from
the mine. We saw that the vast floodplain surprisingly looks infertile and native grass
species are stunted and look scorched [9].
2. Economic Impact
Semistructured interviews and FGD results show that a majority of the respondents
perceive informal ASM as a major income source, which increases their capacity to establish
new local businesses and pay school and health fees of household members. However, the
scale of environmental degradation arising from informal ASM has affected the aquatic
ecosystem and worsened agricultural production for people whose livelihood does not
depend on mining. In the past decade, locals catch low fish and do not obtain eggs
from endangered crocodile species for subsistence and income (Peasant farmer in Tinga,
FGD, 12.12.20). Additionally, the presence of heavy metals in the streams increases the
costs of water treatment for locals. Household wells nearby the stream and mining sites
are contaminated due to discharge from mine sites. The results indicate that 84% (21 of
25 household questionnaires) reported not having access to potable water from within. The
onerous task is that women and children from poor households trek far to fetch water for
domestic use. The results further show that 16% (4 of 25 household questionnaires) buy
bottled and bagged water for household daily needs. Therefore, there are losers as well as
winners. The oldest man growing up with his parents since 1943 narrated that:
“Dokrupe was the leading producer of cassava, maize and cotton in the district
between the 1960s and early 1990s. People hunted game next to their homes and
harvested adequate fish in the stream for subsistence. Surpluses were exchanged
for other grains and clothes. Presently, there is a food shortage in Dokrupe!
Vegetables are brought in from Techiman and Kumasi at inflated prices. A few
rich households whose members practice informal ASM can afford to buy food
for subsistence, while the overwhelmingly poor households struggling to buy
food. The mode of production and exchange has changed, and everything now
is expensive. Informal ASM is a slow but sure killer!” (Community leader/Imam
in Dokrupe, Interview, 23.01.21).
The ability of miners to be resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic was reduced
as many women and children who worked as cooks, transporters, and crushers lost
employment and generated no cash to buy food for consumption during the lockdown
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(March–September 2020) (Widow in Dokrupe, FGD, 22.01.21). Those who had money could
not buy food locally because farmlands had been converted into mining.
3. Social Impact
The results indicate that informal ASM is attracting immigrants from far and near,
which contributes to social bonds through intermarriages and cultural exchanges. The
results also indicate that informal ASM has, however, claimed the lives of 7 boys, 3 girls,
and over 18 cattle in the past decade (Peasant farmers in Tinga, FGD, 12.12.20). “Informal
ASM has wasted precious life! Many lives are being wasted and many more lives would
be wasted later because some people think they must make money by hook or crook” (A
reverend minister in Tinga, FGD, 12.12.20). At the Community-Based Health Planning
and Service in Dokrupe, four injured miners were brought in for medical reviews due to
underground mining accidents which occurred on 18 October 2020. One amputated miner
told us that he kept his right hand inside a changfa leading to it being slashed. The lack of
safety measures in informal ASM is threatening lives.
Many boys and girls have dropped out from school to work in informal ASM and
sometimes bring home gold-impregnated mercury putty to burn on cooking stoves in
open spaces and expose household members to health risks (Woman in Dokrupe, Interview
17.01.21). Some girls at mining sites earn additional income by practicing prostitution,
resulting in unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (ibid). Residents
fear that their boys and girls are likely to have low production and reproductive capacities
in their thirties and will become a burden to the community.
5.2.2. Results of Talensi
1. Environmental Impact
Except for a few cases, concession holders have caused less direct environmental
degradation due to regular monitoring and inspection carried out by the MC. Expert
interviews and FGD results show that SMCL mining practices contradict Ghanaian mining
and environmental laws. Residents informed us that SMCL’s underground mine blasting
had caused structural damage to a basic school building in Gbani. It creates a noise nuisance,
and its waste is spotted on the school landscape, which is later deposited directly to the
sediment load of the stream, leading to an increase in the braiding and erosion of the
stream’s bank. Additionally, we observed in field and on drone images high degrees
of open pits in Datuku and Gbani. The consequences conspire to dispossess residents of
potable drinking water due to the presence of arsenic, cadmium, and nitrate. In the past,
the land immediately next to the stream was the most productive, yielding 21 bags of
maize per acre for peasants, but now it supports no plant or animal life (Peasant farmers
in Gbani, FGD, 12.02.21). Presently, Indigenous people make claims to the best lands and
build plots for themselves, while the less desirable land closest to the stream is reserved
for poor settlers [9]. Residents also informed us that children and livestock frequently fall
inside abandoned pits and die, if unnoticed early (Community leader in Datuku, 08.02.21).
2. Economic impact
The results indicate an increase in cash generation for residents and immigrants
involved in ASM, which has contributed significantly to household upkeep when there is
low agricultural yield. The results also indicate that locals employed in SMCL experience
sustainable cash inflows, which enables them to escape poverty, improve the standard
of living of household dependents, and obtain decent accommodations. The increase in
people’s purchasing power influenced the creation of microcredit companies in Gbani,
which render savings and investment products for locals and immigrants, which hitherto
did not exist. Nonetheless, the economic difficulties for those who do not share in the gold
boom contradict the direct positive side of ASM.
In Gbani, large tracks of land used for farming have been converted into mining.
These farmlands and economic resources are no longer available for residents, making
it more and more difficult for them to cover their subsistence needs. As such, they are
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forced to switch to more marginal land and floodplains. Regrettably, the productivity of
marginal land close to mining sites is very low due to emissions from processing plants.
Locally produced vegetables and cereals are reduced, with people now more dependent
on buying food stuff from the regional market in Bolgatanga and Navrongo (Extensionist
of DoA, Tongo, Interview, 15.02.21). Vulnerable and marginalized women, children, and
physically challenged persons do not have money to buy food stuff at the local and regional
markets. This is heightened by the loss of economic trees, including shea and dawadawa,
which used to provide them with fruits and nuts for cash income.
Additionally, because CRAFT enables ASM gold producers to sell gold on the inter-
national market, miners now bypass the PMMC. This leads to unaccounted ASM gold
produced in the country evading tax and reducing jobs for local licensed gold buyers. We
also gathered that majority of people working in informal ASM who lack formal educa-
tion pay huge sums of money to local consultants to help them produce “fake” reports
to present to gold buyers upon request in international markets. Most of the reviewed
reports are at variance with the reality on the ground because of the ineffective auditing of
reports locally.
3. Social Impact
The study results indicate that the differential distribution in money causes problems,
including behavioral indiscipline in schools. The FGD results show high rates of dropout
and absenteeism and poor academic performance of pupils in Datuku and Gbani compared
to nonmining communities (Retired teacher in Datuku, FGD, 16.02.21). Usually, pupils
(12–17 years) who participate in informal ASM show disrespect to their teachers and
community elders who attempt to prohibit them from working in informal ASM. The
additional money pupils make is often spent on attending weddings, parties, and casinos,
thus resulting in less time to stay home to do homework exercises/assignments (ibid). The
advantage of boys going down narrow tunnels to collect gold ore endows them with a
powerful role in informal ASM, while girls and women transport the ore to crush for milling.
However, they face harsh working conditions, lack job security and safety materials, abuse
drugs (e.g., tramadol, marijuana, alcohol) to work harder, and face threats and intimidation
from their employers (15-year pupil in Gbani, Biographic interview, 05.02.21). This arises
due to a lack of contractual agreements and lack of collective efforts to unionize labor,
which has contributed to tension between mine workers and owners.
5.3. Local Responses to Informal ASM at the Local Level
In this section, we present local responses from the wider community, including
resource managers, mine workers, and owners who are directly involved and others who
are either indirectly or not involved in informal ASM. We categorized the local responses
by local actors who perceive gains and local actors who perceive losses.
5.3.1. Results of Bole
1. Local Responses by Local Actors Who Perceive Gain in Informal ASM
The empirical results show that the economic benefits to the wider community and
powerful actors, including chiefs, gold committees, and mine workers, strongly support
the district mining economy as desirable. In Tinga, 92% indicate that at least one fam-
ily member—a son or daughter—was involved in informal ASM. A young male miner
narrated that:
“authorities do not question the source of people’s wealth! Why will people
waste time and money to go to school to learn how to speak big English but
have no job and money. Informal ASM gives people more money compared to
so-called crop farming and animal rearing. He has made some money to marry,
build guesthouse, buy private and commercial vehicles, operate casinos within
and outside the community. He makes cash donations to churches, community
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committees and political parties, which earns respect for him, but for informal
ASM” (Miner in Tinga, FGD, 16.01.21).
Indeed, along the main street in Tinga, there are clustered businesses (restaurants,
casinos, groceries, and fuel stations). The organic growth of most of the businesses can be
matched to incomes from informal ASM. In Dokrupe, the gold committee and customary
authorities developed inventive strategies to extract rents from ASM, including the media-
tion in disputes between themselves (landowners) and miners; the issuance of business
permits to owners of processing facilities on their soil, mounting checkpoints for donation
collection (one third of the amount of gold-bearing rocks extracted); and the collection of
environmental user fees for land reclamation. They also tolerated mining leading to the
reactivation of the mbowura (warrior cult of the Gonja people) and spiritualists (marabouts)
to provide essential services for miners. The mbowuras are fortified to wield guns and
ammunition to escort miners from the community to the mine and back. The spiritualists
are consulted by miners to help them catch the gold spirit quickly so that they will gather
an abundant harvest to return home richer than they left. The gold committee collects 1%
of the value of gold mined by individuals or groups as a reward for the relevant spiritualist
(Chairman of gold committee in Dokrupe, FGD, 21.01.21). The community undertook self-
help funded projects, including road regraveling and bridge and borehole construction,
and lobbied for the installation of electricity and telecommunication networks to enable
mining to thrive.
2. Local Responses by Local Actors Who Perceive Loss in Informal ASM
The negative social, economic, and environmental impact of informal ASM has forced
60% of household heads whose livelihoods do not depend on mining to fear loss of access
to CPR often without restitution. Thereby, at least one person migrates temporarily to work
elsewhere during the off-farming season. A 43-year-old cashew farmer reported that:
“the presence of mineral wealth contributes to cash crops productivity. Where
cashew crops grow well, miners go to negotiate with the gold committee for
such lands to mine for gold ore and pyrites. His entire 6 acres cashew farm was
destroyed in less than a week without reparation. He is preparing for vengeance
and no longer attends community meetings and makes no monetary contribution
toward community projects either. He depends on handout from the member
of parliament for Bole and sometimes goes to farm in Ejura for cash income”
(Cashew farmer in Tinga, Biographic interview, 14.04.19).
While this narrative seems to invoke a potential intracommunity conflict, it could
be interpreted as an expression of disappointment and boldness against the injustice of
state policies instead of a course of action [39]. However, most of the losers are the power-
less and marginalized who cannot self-organize themselves to react uniformly. Residents
who migrate out temporarily or permanently send remittance to those left behind. How-
ever, mining alone does not account for emigration, but also marriage, education, and
employment opportunities.
5.3.2. Results of Talensi
1. Local Responses by Local Actors Who Perceive Gain in Informal ASM
Some locals considered mining as a complementary livelihood strategy to agricul-
ture. Hitherto, agriculture offered significant employment and income for most people
in northern Ghana. However, the adoption of SAP led to the downfall of certain agri-
cultural activities due to the withdrawal of subsidies on agricultural inputs, including
fertilizer, insecticide, and pesticides. Since then, locals view agriculture as unprofitable,
leading to agricultural labor switching to wage labor in mining as one option of contribut-
ing to families’ household income. Additionally, some retrenched and redeployed staff
and school leavers find solace in obtaining income from mining to start new businesses
and further their education, respectively. Thus, local elites redistribute land in favor of
mining investors.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 6885 17 of 23
2. Local Responses by Local Actors Who Perceive Loss in informal ASM
The results indicate that the unilateral granting of lease rights to SMCL and informal
miners without involvement of key local stakeholders has fostered gossip and dissatisfac-
tion among locals. As such, the MGPJ, tindanas, and urban base elites of the communities
organized around the trope of Indigeneity and forged a collective resistance identity to
strengthen their claims of a recovery of possession. They also relied on the vernacular,
referred to as the Indigenous narrative, combined with various forms of resistance tactics,
including deputations to state officials at the local, regional, and national levels, to contest
the land rights claim of the Gbani chief and SMCL.
The groups held both violent and nonviolent demonstrations on the streets of Gbani
and Tongo with threatening and dissatisfaction inscriptions on banners and placards against
SMCL’s unsustainable mining practices. Locals blew up one of SMCL’s industrial machines
and caused harm to Chinese workers, resulting in the arrest of 12 locals. Subsequently,
the group sued SMCL at the High Court for recovery of possession, indemnity, and land
reclamation (President of MGPJ in Gbani, Interview, 20.02.21). The group has urged the
EPA to hold onto granting SMCL an environmental permit until the court grants its verdict.
SMCL through its barristers and solicitors had entered an appearance before the High
Court. Out of fear of being sanctioned by international certification agencies due to the
massive local and national media campaign war against the SMCL over its known mining
grievances, the top managers of SMCL adopted the new name Earl International Group
(GH) Limited to rebrand its mining activities. The tindanas have also challenged the Gbani
chief to reverse the land leased to SMCL based on the narrative that:
“the position of chiefs in the Upper East region and Talensi in particular, was just
a creation of the colonial administration for easy administration for the colonial
British regime. The tindana institution dates to the precolonial era and before
the advent of any chieftaincy institution. Thus, chiefs ought to know that land
belongs to clans and families with the tindana having the oversight responsibility
of such lands and not chiefs” (A tindana in Gbani, FGD, 21.02.21).
Table 2 presents the summary of the results for easy comparative analysis and discussion.
Table 2. Summary of comparative results.
Main Issues Results of Bole Results of Talensi
Institutional
ambiguities
â Different actors make claims to mineral
resource wealth
â No mining license and concession granted to
local miners
â The district security council is bypassed by
national taskforce to combat informal ASM
without conferring with them
â Weak supervision and monitoring of
informal ASM
â Conflict between local population and
newcomers
â Conflict between informal miners and
concession holders
â Conflict between customary chiefs and
tindanas over informal ASM management
and royalty rights
â The district assembly is bypassed by regional




â Local actors do not enforce land reclamation
after mining
â More open pits
â Water dispossession
â Reduce fish and crocodile
â Unnecessary noise pollution
â Mine sediments litter school compound and
community lands
â Many uncovered/open pits
â Land dispossession
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Table 2. Cont.
Main Issues Results of Bole Results of Talensi
Social Impact
Positive
â Increase social bonds through intermarriages
and cultural exchanges
Negative
â More mine-related deaths
â Pupils drop out from school
â Lack of job security
â Lack of safety measures in mines
Positive
â Participation is social activities including
wedding, naming ceremonies, etc.
Negative
â Behavioral indiscipline in schools
â High rates of school dropout
â Lack of social security
â Threats and intimidation from employers
â Harsh working conditions
Economic Impact
Positive
â Increase income for households engage in
informal ASM
â Development of decent accommodation
Negative
â Increase cost of water treatment for CSWA
and households
Positive
â Increase in cash generation
â Springing of new local businesses
â Existence of microcredit company
Negative
â Not everyone shares in gold boom




Customary chiefs, gold committee, mine workers,
and their families
Losers:
Small-scale farmers, wider community, district
assembly, and the state
Winners:
Customary chiefs, concession holders, SMCL,
mine workers, and their families
Losers:
Small-scale farmers, tindanas, wider community,
district assembly, and the state
6. Discussion: Sustainability Challenges
In this section, we go back to our working hypotheses (see Section 2.5) to discuss
them, keeping in mind the comparative results of the two case studies. As a first step,
we recall that our H1 states that decentralization in NRM will lead to positive social and
environmental outcomes. The proponents of decentralization hold the assumption that
local enfranchisement in NRM will lead to an improvement in social and environmental
standards, which will maintain crucial ecological functions and simultaneously safeguard
essential livelihoods and the economic values of resources. Any positive outcome of
decentralization is largely dependent on the distribution of power, a set of management
rules attributed to the concerned resource, equity in benefit sharing, and the performance
of downward accountability toward the local population [22].
Our empirical case study results do not coexist with the optimistic expectation of
decentralization (H1). The expected outcomes of decentralization in NRM are seldom
realized because democratic decentralization is hardly implemented [1,2,23]. In both Bole
and Talensi, poverty levels have not reduced across the different social strata, except for
a few, and are exacerbated by the uneven distribution of local mineral resource wealth.
Moreover, the results show that under the so-called participatory management arrange-
ment, changes in the rights and powers to manage the resources are skewed in favor of
customary authorities and the gold committee in Bole, which partially fulfil the conditions
that would enable improved social, economic, and environmental sustainability results in
the entrenched “bossism” and social inequality [4]. Similarly, in Talensi, the results show
that the colonial and postcolonial decentralization efforts, which emboldened local chiefs to
play a prominent role in the existing institutional arrangement in decentralized NRM and
in ASM, is expected to continue in the future. Like concerns raised by critical observers
of decentralization in some parts of the world, “this raises important concerns over elite
capture of the decentralization process” [4] (p. 450). This confirms our initial suspicion that
the null hypothesis cannot fully capture the processes at play. We recall that together with
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CRAFT, the decentralization of procedures in ASM leads to actors repositioning strategies,
which ultimately has a negative impact on social, economic, and ecological sustainability.
H2 postulates that the following mechanisms contribute to explain the actors’ reposi-
tioning strategies.
6.1. Central Government Authorities Did not Let Their Responsibilities Go to Local People
In this section, we show how economic factors (e.g., rents, gold price), political
factors (e.g., selective decentralization, vote), and bargaining power relations influence
national government officials not to let their responsibilities go to local people for them
to progressively expand their control over the mining sector, which gradually falls prey
to corruption and resource mismanagement. The centralist system of NRM in successive
postcolonial governments, which resulted in the enactment of new pieces of legislations,
including PNDCL 218 in 1989 and Act 703 in 2006, is influenced by the British colonial
administration that lay the foundation for a centralized system, vesting ownership of all
mineral resource wealth whether in public or private land to the colonial state [28,33].
Since 2006, attempts by central government authorities seem to roll back local people’s
participation and control of mineral resource exploitation amidst Act 462. The empirical
case study results show that central government authorities implemented selective decen-
tralization on grounds of so-called sustainable management, contrary to observations in
other sectors, such as local governance [40], education [41], sustainable urban develop-
ment [42], and environmental management [43]. In the Ghanaian case of NRM for ASM,
selective decentralization only worked in limited sustainable management practices at
local levels. MMDAs are not allowed to grant licenses to miners at the local level, and the
establishment of a district level MC to perform a critical formalization role at the local level
is intentionally delayed, resulting in poor implementation of sustainable mining practices
and a poor capacity to monitor detrimental ASM practices. The case study results indicate
that central government authorities aim to sustain a neopatrimonial relationship for the
extraction of various rents and fees and to reward political party supporters in return
for votes.
In Talensi, central government officials entreated the district authorities to restrict
themselves to signing mineral rights applications and to process the free and prior informed
consent of local stakeholders for SMCL to secure a license, concession, and permit to mine
in Gbani despite its informality [36]. The Minister directed the MC to demarcate ASM areas
in Gbani, which granted him opportunities to issue licenses to miners inside the demarcated
areas. Like the PNDCL 218, Act 703 also turned out to be unsuccessful as an instrument
for ASM formalization because very few ASM operations have been approved by the
Minister to operate in Gbani, while most informal ASM takes place inside the concessions
of mining rights holders, often without their official consent, resulting in local conflicts [4].
The selective implementation of decentralization contributes to miners’ lack of access to
information, leading to nepotism; rent-seeking during the distribution of licenses, leases,
or permits; complexity; and the high cost of registration procedures [4,5].
In Bole, the central government’s bypassing of the assembly to fight against informal
ASM in its territory suggests ambiguity regarding rule interpretation (e.g., Act 462 and Act
703) and enforcement. The central government’s weak mechanism of stopping informal
ASM through a militarized taskforce failed to defuse ASM operation in communities of
Bole [10]. The disenfranchisement of district authorities in Bole and Talensi, makes them
tolerate informal ASM and disregard SMCL’s grievances by relaxing existing regulations
and enforcement, leading to resource over exploitation and destruction of cashew farms,
bodies of water, and forest reserves. “The assembly relaxes its regulatory responsibilities
as revenge for top government officials’ disrespect toward local government authorities”
(DCE in Bole, Interview, 18.01.21).
Sustainability 2021, 13, 6885 20 of 23
6.2. Decentralization in NRM Enables Newcomers from Outside the Communities to Gain Access
to Local Resources, Leading to Conflicts between Locals and Newcomers
Our Bole case study results show that local elites have shown strong support for the
mining economy by deflating any direct and indirect measures that might threaten the
continued operation of informal ASM due to the monumental income it generates for
some actors. The results also indicate that newcomers’ land access has led to the territorial
displacement of marginal groups and peasants. Yet, local citizens have not formed a
collective resistance strategy to challenge their dispossession because of the seemingly
incompatible interest of the various groups [9]. Only a few marginalized individuals
rebuked royalty-receiving landowners, mining financiers, gold committees, the district
assembly, and the state’s reluctance to implement effective land reclamation strategies, thus
reducing land availability for agricultural activities [4]. This forces disenfranchised local
citizens to shift to more marginal land resources far from the community for sustenance,
which are then overexploited leading to environmental degradation [12]. As a result,
exasperation among locals emerges, resulting in instances of intracommunity conflict
between locals and newcomers in Tinga.
In Talensi, the case study results show that the newcomers’ huge rush for customary
land for gold ore mining from 2008 onward due to their financial and political capital,
which helps them to gain exclusive rights of access often guaranteed by the state, results
in vulnerable and disenfranchised people who are on the losing end of the equation, in-
creasingly bereft of meaningful access to CPR [4,11,21]. This leads to colossal local conflicts
between resource users and owners, which are usually shaped by Indigeneity [9,34]. In-
digenous identities are constructed in response to struggles over resources and can be
seen as resistance identities formed as part of a legitimating narrative to assert preferential
claims to resources and to resist dispossession [34]. The use of Indigeneity as a basis
for territorial claims implies that locals have been exposed to international discourses
and are able to articulate their identity in a way that is recognizable and usable by their
advocates [34,41]. The case study results show that local responses have yielded some
successes: they stopped the SMCL company from operation in unauthorized areas, the
damaged school building was repaired, and 47 landowners have been compensated (Pres-
ident of MGPJ in Gbani, Interview, 20.01.21). Our case study result supports Gerber and
Haller’s [17] argument that the bargaining power of local groups and their capacity to
self-organize for a collective action depends to a large extent on the perceived benefits
and loss of the resource. For example, the perceived losses of ground rents to tindanas due
to the local chief’s bypassing them to grant lease rights have led to the formation of the
union of tindanas to resist their marginalization by referring to the ancestral domain and
constitutions (institution shopping).
6.3. The Neoliberal Nature of CRAFT May Lead to Unwanted Outcomes
Our case study results demonstrate that the way CRAFT works in Ghana leads to an
exacerbation of private profits, but this is seen as the necessary price to be paid to gain
access to “good” reports from private ecopreneurs, i.e., local consultants. We argue that
the mere presentation of a “fake” CRAFT report—due to a lack of verifiable mechanisms
in Bole and Talensi—as proof of responsible mining practice for ASM gold producers to
participate in the international market reinforces private ecopreneurs’ own benefits and
financial returns at the expense of many poor and uneducated ASM gold miners who
cannot produce CRAFT reports by themselves. Consequently, private ecopreneurs have
started to acknowledge the CRAFT policy measure as a new, safe, and profitable market,
which is why they represent the winners of the emerging “CRAFT business”. Faced by
reduced profit margins, ASM gold producers increase their environmental degradation
practice to extract more gold ore that would compensate for any loss arising from payments
to local consultants.
Furthermore, the results show that most miners bypass the PMMC to sell in neighbor-
ing countries who hardly ever request CRAFT reports. Ultimately, the state, in contrast,
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remains excluded from the compromises made by private ecoprenuers, it embodies the
loser of the new rules of the game. In particular, the state cannot generate environmental
rents to address water pollution and environmental degradation. As is noted here, “if
informal ASM is not stopped sooner than later, Ghana could be importing potable drinking
water in the next two decades” (Official of CWSA in Bole 21.12.20).
7. Conclusions
Our paper has intended to contribute to broader debates on the relationship among
decentralization in NRM, the formalization of mining rights, and sustainability. We relied
on a combination of political ecology and new institutionalism to direct central attention to
the ways in which power and resources are distributed across society. The added value
of this analytical approach is its ability to capture both the institutional and practical
complexities in the implementation of decentralization in the Ghanaian ASM sector and
its effects at the local level, which enables us to produce a set of more context-specific
narratives. Our case study results show that Act 462, which aims to decentralize control
over mineral resource wealth to the local population, coexists uneasily with the minerals
and mining Act 703, which forms the basis for the formalization of mining rights [4].
This causes institutional ambiguities wherein different actors are now making claims to
mineral resource wealth, leading to intragovernment conflicts over law interpretation and
enforcement, conflicts between locals and newcomers, conflicts between informal miners
and concession holders over access to above- and underground mineral resource wealth,
and conflicts among customary authorities (chiefs and tindanas) seeking to secure ancestral
domain rights and the associated royalties.
Despite the conflicts, decentralization has improved a selected few local actors’ access
to mineral resource wealth and threatened the majority with dispossession, leading to
social, economic, and environmental sustainability challenges. We argue that the Ghanaian
national government tends to undervalue the threats of sustainable development as a
constitutional objective resulting from the selective implementation of decentralization.
Since local government actors are disempowered, and the state taskforce cannot be ev-
erywhere to monitor and supervise local resource exploiters, environmental degradation
continues relentlessly.
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Abbreviations
ASM Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining
CLS Customary Land Secretariat
CPR Common Pool Resources
CRAFT Code of Risk Mitigation for Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Engaging in Formal Trade
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FGD Focus Group Discussions
GH Ghana
GSA Geological Survey Authority
LC Lands Commission
MC Minerals Commission
MGPJ Movement of Gbani People for Justice
MLNR Ministry of Lands and Natural Resource
MMDAs Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies
NRM Natural Resource Management
PMMC Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation
PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law
SAP Structural Adjustment Program
SMCL Shaanxi Mining (GH) Company Limited
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